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Abstract 
The main goal of this dissertation is to study the hypothesis of an acquisition in the retail sector, 
between Group Jerónimo Martins (acquirer) and Organización Soriana (target). Jerónimo 
Martins is an international group focused on the food distribution and specialized retail. To 
what the former is concerned, JMT operates in three countries – Portugal, Colombia and Poland 
– totaling two continents, Europe and America. The latter’s operation, on the other hand, 
focuses solely in the European continent through brands such as Hebe, Jeronymo and Hussel. 
Organización Soriana operates grocery and department retail stores representing the second 
largest retailer in Mexico. Yet, the firm is going through a rough period due to both its high 
level of debt and costs. Consequently, the operation poses as a great opportunity for any of the 
firms involved. By leveraging on its American’s retail market expertise obtained through its 
internationalization experience with Ara, Group Jerónimo Martins would be able to expand its 
operation to a new market strengthening its position in the American Continent. Organización 
Soriana could, likewise, take advantage of this operation to solidify its financial statements. 
The combined company would be able to, not only decrease its costs due to the reduction in the 
number of employees, but also through the increase in leverage over the other supply chain 
players resulting in an increase in bargaining power. Such synergies are valued at 1,408.90 
million Euros. 
Abstrato 
O principal objetivo deste dissertação é estudar a viabilidade da aquisição por parte do Grupo 
Jerónimo Martins (adquirente) e da Organização Soriana (empresa alvo). Jerónimo Martins é 
um grupo internacional focado nos sectores da distribuição alimentar e do retalho especializado. 
No que toca ao sector da distribuição alimentar, o Grupo opera em três países – Portugal, 
Colombia e Polónia – totalizando dois continente, Europa e América. Por outro lado, no retalho 
especializado, a empresa foca-se somente no continente Europeu, através da operacionalização 
de marcas como Hebe, Jeronymo e Hussel. 
A Organização Soriana desempenha a sua atividade através da gestão de mercearias e 
supermercados, representando o segundo maior retalhista no mercado Mexicano. Contudo, a 
empresa tem estado a ultrapassar um período adverso, resultado do seu elevado nível de 
endividamento e estrutura de custos desadequada. Consequentemente, a operação de fusão entre 
as firmas surge como uma excelente oportunidade para ambas. Ao utilizar o conhecimento do 
mercado americano ganho através da sua experiência com a marca Ara, o Grupo Jerónimo 
Martins seria capaz de expandir a sua operação para um novo mercado, reforçando a sua posição 
no mesmo. De forma similar, a Soriana poderia tirar proveito desta operação para solidificar a 
sua posição financeira. A empresa resultante desta operação seria capaz não só de diminuir os 
seus custos derivado da redução do número de empregados, mas também de tirar partido de 
alterações na cadeia de valor resultando num maior poder negocial com os seus fornecedores. 
Tais sinergias estão avaliadas em 1,408.90 milhões de Euros. 
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This thesis presents the hypothesis of Jerónimo Martins acquiring Soriana, a Mexican Retailer, 
and analyses both companies involved and the synergies that could arise from the combination 
of the two firms. 
In the subsequent chapter, the existing literature on Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) is 
reviewed, where important topics such as drivers of M&A, valuation techniques, and synergies 
will be discussed. 
Moving on into the 2nd chapter, one will study the industry in which both companies operate 
with a deep focus on the competitive analysis and its outlook.  
On the next chapter, this thesis aims to explain why this deal would be beneficial for both 
players and why exactly it makes sense for the retailers to merge into a single entity. 
It, then, follows the valuation of both companies involved in the deal in chapter 4. Starting with 
Jerónimo Martins followed by Soriana, one will develop a deep understanding on how each 
company is performing by having a look at each strategy, economic and financial analysis. 
Before moving on to the transaction itself and how to perform the post-merger integration at 
chapters 0 and 7, respectively, one will first have a look at synergies which are expected to 
come out of the proposed deal and how much they are worth on chapter 5. 
Lastly, chapter 8 presents the conclusions on whether Jerónimo Martins should or not invest in 
Soriana as a way to expand its operation to a new market and, if so, at which price should 






1 Literature Review 
The pursue for growth is something which has been intrinsically linked to the economy activity, 
in general. Such growth can typically be achieved either organically or inorganically. Organic 
growth occurs when a firm develops itself in a standalone basis. In other words, when a 
company increases its output or enhances its sales (i.e., pursues strategies which allow it to 
grow its customer base or invests in assets which enable an increase in productivity). Inorganic 
growth, on the other hand, derives from a merger, acquisition or takeover operation rather than 
an increase in the company's own business activity. 
As this thesis presents the hypothesis of Jerónimo Martins acquiring Soriana, one will focus 
primarily on the second type of growth. Therefore, throughout this chapter, one will look at 
what motivates a firm to grow inorganically rather than organically, through which methods 
can an acquirer evaluate a potential target, how can such financial operation generate value for 
the acquiring shareholders, whether or not such strategies work and ultimately how can one 
guarantee the achievement of a successful merger.  
 
1.1 Mergers and Acquisitions 
1.1.1 Drivers of an M&A 
Ultimately, the main driver of a Merger & Acquisition deal should be to increase value for 
shareholders of both firms. Cloodt, M., Hagedoorn, J. and Kranenburg, Hans V. (2006) 
mentioned that many companies carry on looking at M&A as a popular and well succeeded 
strategy of growth. How that growth is generated, however, may vary largely depending on 
which companies are in on the deal. One could argue that a good proxy for such would be 
increases in industry concentration, competitiveness, productivity growth, or technology 
transfer which, in turn, can be measured by valuing synergies, increases in diversification, use 
of excess cash or market power. Nonetheless, not all of these options have been created equal.  
When looking for a reason to justify a deal, executives usually recur to synergies – i.e., the 




firms operating independently. Consequently, the success of a deal will be largely dependent 
on the how well one values the synergies in a given investment and how well aligned with 
reality are the assumptions supporting the synergies’ forecast.  
Synergies can be categorized either in operational (e.g., revenue enhancement and cost savings) 
or financial (e.g., tax benefits, diversification, a higher debt capacity and uses for excess cash). 
Put differently, operating synergies affect the operations of the combined firm whereas financial 
synergies, on the other hand, are more focused on potential higher cash flows or a lower cost 
of capital (discount rate) or both. 
Previous research has shown that focusing on acquiring companies in a related field increases 
the likelihood that the acquiring firm will be able to exploit synergies. Particularly, some 
authors (Bruner, Where M&A Pays and Where It Strays: A Survey of the Research, 2004) have 
shown that focusing on related businesses works better than diversifying. Furthermore, studies 
also show evidence that an increase in market share done through horizontal M&A (i.e., 
mergers in which companies operate within the same sector) providea positive returns. 
Surprisingly, even in such case, the increase of market share is not the main driver for the 
increase in wealth, however. Interestingly, it is the exploitation of the synergies created by the 
combination of two companies that are very similar and use the same resources that potentiate 
increase in shareholder value.  
As a consequence, one could argue that choosing a target is one of the most – if not the single 
most – important decision a firm should on. 
 
1.1.2 Are M&A worth it? 
As previously mentioned, the primary driving force that often justifies the interest in a merger 
or acquisition is the creation of synergies. Yet, in his paper The Value of Synergy, Damodaran, 
A. (2005) makes a case on how seldom are companies able to deliver the value they were 
expected to extract from synergies. Such happens, essentially, due to the fact that synergies are 
incorrectly valued, inadequately planned for and much more difficult to put into practice than 




in the stock price of the acquiring firms after these announcements comes out, illustrating the 
market’s skepticism towards the announcement of a M&A deal – for knowing how hard it is to 
actually put synergies into practice. 
According to the author, not only contributes to this skepticism the fact that companies face a 
hard time exploiting the synergies and integrating both cultures, but also the fact that 
acquisitions require full payment upfront and, therefore, any postponement in the promised 
synergies will massively affect the expected net present value of the investment 
Therefore, one could be sceptic on whether or not to go ahead with such operation based 
exclusively on synergies. 
 
1.2 M&A valuation 
In order to conduct a successful M&A transaction both firms have to agree to a common price 
which, depending on the techniques employed, will require several variables. Depending on 
valuation method used and the assumptions made, one will come up with a final price. For that 
reason, it is crucial that one does not come up to a conclusion based solely on one technique. 
This thesis focuses on a technique mostly known as discounted cash flow (DCF) model which 
is, later on, complemented by a relative valuation of both firms. Nonetheless, valuations can 
also be undertaken through other approaches such as the dividend discount model and the 
Adjusted Present Value.  
Each technique has its own pros and cons and there is no such thing as a “one size fits all” to 
what valuation is concerned. Consequently, there is no single correct value for any given firm 
either.  
The primary method considered on this thesis, the DFC model, derives the firm value from the 
present value of expected future cash flows of that firm which are then discounted by the 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC). This method uses discounted cash flows which 




flexible method to value a company but the firm value is highly dependent on subjective 
forecasts.  
 
1.3 Cross border deals 
Cross-border deals have a bit more of complexity associated with it. Markets in developed 
countries are getting to a saturation point and, therefore, are fully mature. For that reason, 
companies start to look for alternatives to grow their business. Due to the efforts of several 
authors, it is by now well known that companies of leading developed markets are currently 
looking to emerging markets as an opportunity to grow – Zenner, M., Matthews, M. and Marks, 
J. (2008). This trend started being particularly noticeable after the most recent financial crisis 
which resulted in a reduction in domestic competition. Appropriately, emerging-market 
corporate acquirers today have valuations that are high relatively to both their developed-market 
peers and to their own historical valuations. 
Consequently, acquirer must be well aware of how much the synergies from a prospect deal 
ought to be and how exactly will those be put in place to ensure that shareholders are able to 
get an increase in value. According to the same authors, it is, therefore, especially important to 
carry out an adjustment of the metrics of the standard valuation methods for tax, accounting, 
and risk differences among jurisdictions when performing a cross-border deal valuation. 
 
1.4 Payment Method 
It is also important to make a reflection on how will the acquiring company pay for the target’s 
acquisition. Historically, mergers have been typically paid by through common stock exchange 
whereas acquisition are usually paid in cash - Travlos, N. (1987). Yet, each method has its 




Some studies concluded that companies which acquire other through pure stock exchange 
acquisitions experienced significant losses whereas the ones which acquirers through cash 
offers experienced normal returns – Travlos, N. (1987) 
Underlying any merger and acquisition deal there is the risk that by not being able to fully 
exploit the synergies’ values estimated, one will incur in an acquisition premium whose 
advantages will not be materialized. According to the literature – Rappaport, A., Sirower, M. 
(1999) –, in case the acquisition is done through cash, the acquiring firm’s shareholders are the 
ones who take on this risk. In transactions which involve stock transactions, however, that same 
risk is shared with selling shareholders. 
Not only financials take play in how such deal is financed, however. Managers’ personality 
traits also have shown to influence such decision. According to some authors – Harris and Raviv 
(1988), Stulz (1988) and Amihud, Lev, and Travlos (1990) – managers who wish to preserve 
control over the firm (i.e., wish to avoid future ownership dilution) prefer to use cash as a 
payment method. Furthermore, there are also other factors influencing the chosen payment 
method such as target and acquiring dimensions and their investment opportunities – Martin 
(1996). 
All of this has influence in the ways the market perceives the deal. In fact, certain authors – 
Hazelkorn, T., Zenner, M. and Shivdasani, A. (2004) – were able to empirically come up to the 
conclusion that cash transactions had a median short-term excess return of 0.9% compared to -
1.9% for stock transactions. Generally speaking, the market reaction was more favorable for 
cash-financed transactions than for stock-financed transactions. In the attempt to take this 
argument forward, some – Myers and Majluf (1984) – hypothesized that such phenomenon is 
a result of the asymmetry of information between the bidder and the target on the value of the 






2 Industry Analysis 
The Industry 
The retail industry varies largely depending on the country one analyzes. Consequently, as JMT 
operates in three countries – Portugal, Poland and Colombia –, in order to fully understand the 
business, one must examine each of the markets separately. 
Due to the outbreak of the global economic crisis in 2008 and subsequent constraints imposed 
by austerity measures, the industry started to pick up again in 2014. Although Portugal has 
witnessed a real income growth in the last few years mainly supported by the increase in the 
private consumption which lead to an increase in 5.7%, according to INE, from 2016 to 2017, 
the sub-prime crisis changed the way Portuguese families shopped with two clear trends 
emerging: (i) Portuguese citizens become more rational, waiting for promotions and discounts 
periods. As a consequence, families currently shop more often but buy less; (ii) consumers 
increase its connectiveness with brands and companies. Therefore, weighting more the 
pleasantry of the purchasing experience. 
To what Poland is concerned, the retail market grew 6.0% in 2017, according to the Central 
Statistical Office. The specialized retail in health and beauty in Poland also showed a positive 
growth rate. Both sectors benefited from a basket of social measures whose primarily goal is to 
increase private consumption such as Family 500 Plus through which the government attributes 
500 zlotys to each family for each child one has – first child excluded. 
Conversely, in Colombia, the wholesale retail sector decreased by 4.7% in 2017, according to 
National Department Administrative of Statistics (DANE). Similarly, the gross sales in the 
Mexican retail sector decreased 2.0%, based on data from Instituto Nacional de Estadística y 
Geografía, although the country witness a stable economic performance on the overall 
economy. Such might be a consequence of the increase in global protectionism, increasing 
tensions between the United States of America and China and a reverse course to what energy 
and commodity prices are concerned. All factors hinder investment and trade enticing a 








In the following years, retail is expected to undergo constant disruptions as a new digital era is 
expected to outburst. Hence, a new wave of changes lies ahead. As a result, new smaller and 
tech-enabled competitors are appearing in the market. Therefore, it’s quite clear that what will 
separate winners from losers will be the retailers’ ability to focus their investments in 
empowering the consumer – which according to analysts it the only single certainty at the 
current moment – as these become increasingly aware of how much power they hold.  
The challenge, therefore, will be how to drive true loyalty. To overcome such challenges, one 
must invest in consumers’ convenience, add value to the shopping experience, taking friction 
out of the journey and focusing on tearing down barriers. In order to do so, retailers will not 
only have to be able to adapt their current business model to target their campaigns for more 
personalized services but also to deploy advanced technologies to their business models in order 
to preserve their market share. This could be obtained by facial-recognition software, for 
instance. 
In other words, in order to maintain their competitive advantage, traditional retailers will have 
to shift their competitive positioning. Growth will no longer be able to be obtained simply 
through expansion, but through big investments in all areas of the business. 
As a consequence, the question that pose is: how can one differentiate itself in an era where 
digitally native vertical brands grew nearly three times faster by positioning themselves focused 
on consumer experience? 
According to the Retail Industry Trends report produced by specialists at Deloitte, retailers must 
refine their value proposition and grow their customer base. To do so, mass customization must 
be abandoned and ultra-personalization through data aggregation and activation must be 




learning and automation will foster growth and increase revenue. Lastly, retailers must not 
forgo to look for adjacent sectors to increase value to customers. 
 
2.1 Companies Analysis 
Michael Porter’s Five Competitive Forces Model developed in 1998 helps companies to 
analyze the main existing risks within the industry they operate in. This strategic tool can be 
used for determining entry barriers, rivalry within the industry, pressure from substitutes and 
power of customers and suppliers. 
Although most countries do not have entry barriers for the retail sector, the competition can be 
quite intense between the existing players This is particularly important due to the fact that it is 
extremely hard for a retailer to differentiate itself from other players – i.e., the pressure from 
substitutes is extremely high. Hence, consumers have a lot of bargaining power. Several factors 
contribute to this such as the availability of alternative options for buying like online shopping, 
different modes of payment, availability of home delivery service, and cost of the substitute 
products can intensify the threats from the substitutes.  
In order to overcome these obstacles, a retailer might try to achieve a competitive edge over its 
counterparts by achieving economies of scale in production, stiff competitive rivalry amongst 
the other major industry players and/or offer a variety of products to maximize customer 
satisfaction and strengthening customer loyalty. Rivalry within the industry might be seen as 
both a weakness, if the competitive rivalry is high, or a opportunity, because is represents new 
avenues for maximizing profits for the firms. 
Yet, if a new firm is able to stablish itself in the market, it might break the existing balance of 
the current players. In order to avoid that, companies operating in this sector usually try to 
strengthen their position by developing a lean distribution infrastructure and an efficient supply 
chain framework or gaining a cost advantage or low-cost leadership. 
Retailers suppliers’ bargaining power, on the other hand, is usually low. Generally speaking, 




inputs are unique. Yet, in retail there is a high number of suppliers relative to retailers. 
Consequently, that proposition is not true. In other words, the former does not hold a lot of 
power over the latter. 
 
2.2 Jerónimo Martins 
Pedro Soares Dos Santos, the group’s Chairman of The Board of Directors and CEO strongly 
advocates that Jerónimo Martin’s vision is “to democratize the access to quality products and 
food solutions through a strategy geared towards value creation, defined by a philosophy of 
sustainable development.”. In order to make sure it’s able to achieve that, the Group focuses its 
food distribution and specialized retail operations on four pillars: (i) promoting good health 
through food; (ii) respecting the environment; (iii) sourcing responsibly; (iv) supporting 
surrounding communities. All of this contributes greatly to the ultimate objective, ensuring the 
continuity of the operations and autonomy in strategic decision-making, bearing in mind the 
various stakeholders. Consequently, the company has experienced an increasing growth, 
becoming one of the market leaders in the three countries it operates in – Portugal, Poland and 
Colombia.  
What back in 1792 started as single mini market in the center of Lisbon, Portugal became one 
of most prestigious stores in the city shortly afterwards. Despite its initial success, it took 
Jerónimo Martins 146 years to undergo its first big transformation. It was not until 1938 that it 
started to invest in new areas of business, specifically in the manufacturing of margarines and 
cooking products. Nonetheless, what followed afterwards were years of good fortune and 
excellent crops resulting in the development of a joint venture with the english-dutch company 
Unilever in 1949. 
Looking to expand its market reach, the firm changed its strategy completely in 1978 and 
invested in the food distribution industry (food retail and wholesale industries) with the 
establishment of the Pingo Doce supermarket chain. In order to solidify its market position, the 
firm acquired Recheio Cash & Carry (food wholesale chain) in 1988 followed by the acquisition 




itself into an international player through the acquisition of Eurocash, a Polish food wholesale 
company.  
Fast forwarding to 2019, Jerónimo Martins predicts very different outlooks for the several 
markets it operates in. In Portugal, although the scenario seems to be stable as no changes are 
foreseen in consumer’s consumption patterns there are still reason for concerns related 
primarily due to instability derived from Brexit and economic slowdown in Europe. Similarly, 
there are some reluctancies in Colombia due to the crisis that is ongoing in Venezuela. 
Conversely, Poland does not seem to conceal any problem as a maintenance of the good 
economic performance which the country has been benefiting is expected. 
Regardless of the economic outlook, Jerónimo Martins focuses in promoting profitable and 
sustainable growth in the long-term. Therefore, the Group proactively conceptualizes ways to 
adjust to new challenges in the horizon – particularly the aging population which will have a 
hard time going shopping due to limited mobility. To tackle such challenges resulting of an 
uncertain future, the Group leverages on its strong financial position which allows it the 
flexibility to grow inorganically, if investing opportunities which fit the overall strategy present 
themselves. That is, investing on its expansion and growth, fortifying its market leader position 
and preserving its profitability profile.  
Currently, Jerónimo Martins has a market capitalization of $8,90 billion (as of 04.08.2019). In 
a sector dominated by Walmart and Costco, the Portuguese retailer has been solidifying its 
position which has earned it the 55th position in the overall retailing industry and the 1st among 
its Portuguese peers from a revenue standpoint, according to Deloitte. 
 












After becoming public in 1989, Jeronimo Martin’s stock price traced a trend of growth, with 
several picks along the way. The first big increase in the stock price occurred between 2008 
and 2012. The second pick happened only two years later from 2014 to 2017 which is believed 
to have been caused by an ambitious expansion plan and program to convert over 1,700 stores 
to a new layout, focusing on valuing perishable items. 
 
Figure 2 - Jerónimo Martins' Stock Price Evolution and S&P 500 (Thomson Reuters Eikon, 2019) 
Regarding the capital structure of the company, the percentage of debt has been held somewhat 
constant for the past 5 years. From 75% in 2012 to 73% in 2018, debt has been representing, 
on average, 73% of total capital. This average debt-to-capital ratio of the historical period is 
higher than both the average ratio for the retail industry and food wholesalers, 65.17% and 
63.00%, respectively (Damoradan, Debt to capital & debt to equity ratios). 
Profitability 
                  
  Industry Median 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Gross Margin 27.6% 20.6% 21.2% 22.1% 21.2% 22.2% 22.4% 22.4% 
Operating Margin 9.4% 5.2% 5.3% 4.9% 4.9% 5.6% 6.0% 5.3% 
Table 1 - Jeronimo Martins’ Profitability Ratios 
DuPont/Earning Power 
                  
  Industry Median 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Asset Turnover 1.0% 1.41 1.37 1.28 1.20 1.30 1.19 1.17 
Pretax ROA 5.60% 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 
Pretax ROE 11.1% 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.09 









                  
  Industry Median 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Quick Ratio 0.9 0.31 0.37 0.38 1.26 0.29 0.3 0.28 
Current Ratio 1.74 0.89 1.01 1.1 2.04 0.98 0.99 0.98 
Times Interest Earned 5.8 18.2 - - - 4.4 3.7 3.5 
Table 3 - Jerónimo Martins' Liquidity Ratios 
Operating 
                  
  Industry Median 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
A/R Turnover 12.6 18.40 16.20 15.90 19.00 33.50 33.80 21.70 
Inv Turnover 6.4 6.20 5.80 5.10 5.10 5.30 4.50 4.30 
Table 4 - Jerónimo Martins' Operating Ratios 
The FCF Statement has been quite irregular, registering values between $152 million and 
$514.6 million mainly due to investments in Capital Expenditures and changes regarding the 
long-term debt structure which might have been used to pay for dividends as these also increase 
within the historic period. 
Jerónimo Martins seems to hold neither a competitive advantage in quality, perception or 
branding – which would allow it to charge more for its products – nor in product costs, 
considering that, compared to its peers, the Portuguese retailer gross margin’s figure has been 
historically lower than the industry median. However, it must manage its selling, general and 
administrative (SG&A) and interest expenses well, as it catches up on its peers at EBITDA 
margin – although this figure has been deterioration from 6.9% in 2012 to 5.6% in 2018. 
Moreover, on what the firm’s ability to meet short-term obligations is concerned, both quick 
and current ratios are lower than the industry median. The current ratio has not been evolving 
much, rounding 0.46 within the historical period. The quick ratio, on the other hand, is 
particularly worrying as it is not only lower than the industry median but it also has decreased 
by 11%. 
Nonetheless, the firm does seem to perform well on its ability to cover interest costs at 27.6x, 
well ahead of its peers, as on its capacity to turn inventory over, despite the fact that it has also 





Originally founded in 1968, Soriana came to existence as a dream of two brothers, Francisco 
and Armando Martín Borque, to become a market leader in the food retail sector by serving a 
continuously increasing number of communities, ultimately delivering the highest value to its 
shareholders. To do so, they focused on offering the best shopping experience for the client 
while, simultaneously, being the best place to work for their employees, derived from constant 
innovation. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that Soriana focuses its Corporate Social 
Responsibility strategy in (i) being correct and polite, (ii) operating as a single team with a 
common goal, (iii) satisfying the Customer, (iv) doing as much as possible to anticipate and 
innovate and be committed to the Soriana insignia. Focusing on these 4 pillars, the company 
operates a total of 644 stores under various insignias such as “Soriana Hiper”, “Soriana Super”, 
“Soriana Mercado” and “Soriana Express”. Additionally, it offers online shopping and delivery 
services through Soriana e-commerce platform. Nonetheless, regardless of the insignia, it is 
common desire to build up a distinct and strong brand for their customers, suppliers, 
collaborators, shareholders and community. Such aspiration seems to be paying off. Although 
Soriana has fallen victim of a net income decrease of 21% to PS3.6B, partly offset by Share of 
profit (loss) of associates and increase in expense from PS28M to PS365.1M in 2018 due to 
market condition, it is currently the biggest retailer in Mexico and the fourth largest in Latin 
America. 
 







Organizacion Soriana SAB de CV
Shanghai Bailian Group Co Ltd
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Figure 4 - Soriana's Stock Price Evolution and S&P 500 (Thomson Reuters Eikon, 2019) 
Since 1987, Soriana has seen its stock price increase almost year after year. Nonetheless, the 
company encountered some problems in 2012 after hitting a peak at $49.3. Although it has 
experienced a slight improvement in 2016, it has yet to realize the full potential that once 
possessed. In fact, the company’s stock price has been decreasing for the past three years and 
has just recently matched 2006’s figure. This might be a consequence of Soriana being unable 
to keep up with its industry peers.  
Financially, the company is, currently, at a weak standpoint. Although Gross Margin has been 
increasing steadily over the years, it is still under the industry mean. Similarly, the EBITDA 
Margin is also under the industry median with the aggravating circumstance that it is not 
performing any better right now than it was back in 2012. In fact, the net income generated 
from every $1 by the company’s assets has actually been decreasing. In this respect, ROA 
illustrates this quite clearly with a reduction from 7.0% to 4.3% in the historical period of 2012 
to 2018. Here, what used to be a ratio in which the group performed better than its peers, is now 
just another one in which it is underperforming by those standards.  
Moving on to liquidity the same scenario persists. Although the firm is doing better to what its 
current ratio is concerned compared to 2012, the quick ratio is deteriorating. Regardless of its 
development, both ratios paint a very dark picture on Soriana’s ability to pay short-term 









In summary, Soriana clearly appears to have a sub-optimal performance comparing it with its 
peers within the retail industry which could translate into the existence of room for 
improvement and further optimization of its operations. 
Profitability 
                  
  Industry Median 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Gross Margin 23.4% 20.6% 21.2% 22.1% 21.2% 22.2% 22.4% 22.4% 
EBITDA Margin 7.7% 7.1% 7.2% 6.9% 6.8% 7.9% 7.1% 7.7% 
Table 5 - Soriana's Profitability Ratios 
DuPont/Earning Power 
                  
  Industry Median 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Pretax ROA 5.60% 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 
Table 6 – Soriana’s DuPont Ratios 
Liquidity 
                  
  Industry Median 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Quick Ratio 0.51 0.31 0.37 0.38 1.26 0.29 0.30 0.28 
Current Ratio 1.03 0.89 1.01 1.1 2.04 0.98 0.97 0.98 
Times Interest Earned 16.6 18.2 - - - 4.4 3.6 3.5 
Table 7 – Soriana’s Liquidity Ratios 
Operating 
                  
  Industry Median 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Inv Turnover 7.8 6.20 5.80 5.10 5.10 5.30 4.60 4.30 
Table 8 – Soriana’s Operating Ratios 
Focusing on the capital structure, Soriana has decrease slightly its debt-to-capital ratio from 
2012 to 2014. At that point in time, we assisted a turning point in which the firm started to 
gradually increase the amount of debt held in proportion to its total capital. In result, in 2018 
debt represented 55% to the company’s total capital. 
The FCF Statement has witnessed a huge variation within the historical period in a very short 
period of time. From 2015 to 2016, the FCF grew by 76% particularly due the acquisition of 




business formats and market segments which provide a greater opportunity for growth and 
profitability. Additionally, according to Soriana’s management, the operation would also add 
to the growth of the country, trigger innovation, offer new business opportunities for suppliers, 
raise consumption and investment, create more buying options nationally and generate more 
jobs.  Furthermore, according to the Cash Flow of Financing Activities, it appears to have taken 
place some sort of debt renewal through the issuance of new debt to pay old one, probably due 
to lower interest rates which have been around lately. In other words, it looks like Soriana issued 
new debt and used that same debt to pay for old outstanding debt, which would only occur if 
the company had been able to negotiate a better (i.e., lower) interest rate on the new loan. 
 
3 Deal Rationale 
Strong management and effective planning from Jerónimo Martins have resulted in strong 
performance across the three continents in which the firm operates in. Nonetheless, one can 
grow so much through organic growth until it reaches its limit point. Therefore, as a means to 
improve its financial performance and increase shareholder value expanding its assets, income 
and market presence, the company could take its internationalization in the food distribution 
sector one step further. Gathering all the insight it has based on past successful transitions such 
as Biedronka and ARA, Jerónimo Martins could try to replicate the same approach and target 
another company, exploring the inorganic growth path once more.  
Soriana poses as the perfect option to do so. On one hand, this group operates in a market in 
which Jerónimo Martins already has operations – Latin America; more specifically, Mexico. 
Consequently, the acquirer would be able to apply its know-how and market insight while, 
simultaneously, increasing its market share with a somehow controlled risk through the 
exploitation of a new market. Furthermore, by focusing on a horizontal merger, JMT would 
have access to cheaper raw materials (or increase cost efficiency). Lastly, there could be some 
tax considerations worth taking into consideration. If one argues that the new entity would not 
be so profitably right away, Jerónimo Martins could benefit from a tax-loss carried forward 




On the other hand, as one had already the opportunity to grasp from tables Table 5, Table 6, 
Table 7 and Table 8, Soriana it’s somehow under-performing comparing to its peers. Therefore, 
it has room for improvement to what operation’s optimization is concerned. In such a scenario, 
Sociedade Francisco Manuel dos Santos, SGPS SA should bid for a majority stake in the 




The enterprise value of a company at any given moment is nothing more than the sum of its 
future cash flows. Therefore, in order to accurately estimate the value of the firm, one needs to 
forecast its financial performance for the upcoming years. To do so, there are a few key 
assumptions guiding such exercise that must be made crystal clear, particularly to what the 
growth rate, the WACC and the tax rate is concerned. 
 
4.1 Jerónimo Martins 
4.1.1 Financial Projections 
In order to compute the Free Cash Flow for each of the years, one would need nine components: 
Net Sales, Cost of Goods Sold, Selling, General and Administrative Expenses, EBIT, Tax Rate, 
EBI, Depreciation and Amortization, Changes in Working Capital and Capital Expenditure.  
Starting by Net Sales, to forecast how much it will be for each of the years within the explicit 
period, one started out by taking into consideration the level of activity which the firm has been 
performing. In other words, by averaging out the net sales growth rate over the last six years 
one came up with an average growth rate of 8.09%.  





Net Sales Explicit Period’s Growth (in million EUR)  
  2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
Net Sales 17,337.00 18,740.27 20,257.11 21,896.74 23,669.07 25,584.86 
Table 9 - Jerónimo Martin's Net Sales Projections 
 
To what Cost of Goods Sold is concerned, one computed the average of its historical proportion 
to Net Sales, resulting in 78.48%. This value was then multiplied by each year’s net sales 
according to Table 9, resulting in an annual figure for Cost of Goods Sold presented on Table 
10: 
COGS Explicit Period’s Growth (in million EUR)  
  2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
COGS 13,606.42 14,707.73 15,898.19 17,184.99 18,575.96 20,079.50 
Table 10 - Jerónimo Martins' Cost of Goods Sold Projections 
The same logic was applied to the Selling, General and Administrative Expenses. In this case 
the historical proportion of it relative to Net Sales averaged 16.34% which represented the 
following figures: 
SG&A Expenses Explicit Period’s Growth (in million EUR) 
  2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
SG&A 2,833.08 3,062.39 3,310.27 3,578.20 3,867.82 4,180.89 
Table 11 - Jerónimo Martins' SG&A Projections 
Based on the figures forecasted above, one can calculate the EBIT as shown in Table 12: 
(in million EUR) 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
(+) Net Sales 17,337.00 18,740.27 20,257.11 21,896.74 23,669.07 25,584.86 
(-) COGS 13,606.42 14,707.73 15,898.19 17,184.99 18,575.96 20,079.50 
(-) Selling/General/Admin. Expenses 2,833.08 3,062.39 3,310.27 3,578.20 3,867.82 4,180.89 
(=) EBIT 897 970 1,049 1,134 1,225 1,324 
Table 12 - Jerónimo Martins' EBIT Projections 
Moving one step closer to the FCFF, the EBI was calculated assuming that the income tax rate 




For the Depreciation and Amortization, the forecasted figures were computed in two phases. 
First, one computed the proportion of each year’s Depreciation/Amortization on the Property, 
Plant and Equipment’s total net value. Afterwards, the average from 2013 to 2018 was 
calculated – 6.67%. Table 13 presents the Depreciation and Amortization projections’ results 
for 2019 to 2023. 
 
D&A Explicit Period’s Growth (in million EUR)  
  2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
D&A 350.00 373.35 398.25 424.81 453.15 483.38 
Table 13 - Jerónimo Martin's D&A Projections 
To what the Net Working Capital is concerned, one forecasted the figures for both Current 
Assets and Current Liabilities based on the last five years average growth rate – 8.75% and 
8.49%, respectively – and from there derived the Working Capital and, subsequently, the 
Changes in Working Capital: 
∆ Working Capital Explicit Period’s Growth (in million EUR) 
  2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
Current Assets 1,961.20 2,132.84 2,139.50 2,522.50 2,743.26 2,983.35 
Current Liabilities 4,187.20 4,452.79 4,928.58 5,347.13 5,801.22 6,293.88 
Working Capital -2,226.00 -2,409.95 -2,609.08 -2,824.63 -3,057.96 -3,310.53 
∆ Working Capital 0.00 -183.95 -199.13 -215.55 -233.33 -252.57 
Table 14 - Jerónimo Martin's Working Capital Projections 
Regarding the Capital Expenditure, for the purpose of this thesis, it was assumed to grow 
proportionally to the past five years’ operating income’s average growth rate. Therefore, the 
growth rate considered the same as the EBIT’s growth rate, 4.72%. 
Capital Expenditures Explicit Period’s Growth (in million EUR)  
  2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
CapEx -719.80 -753.80 -789.40 -826.68 -865.72 -906.61 





The aforementioned projections resulted in the Free Cash Flow to the Firm presented on Table 
16 and Figure 5 - Jerónimo Martins' Free Cash Flow to the FirmFigure 5: 
 Explicit Period Perpetuity 
JMT (in million Euros) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
Net Sales 18,740.27 20,257.11 21,896.74 23,669.07 25,584.86 
COGS 14,707.73 15,898.19 17,184.99 18,575.96 20,079.50 
Gross Profit 4,032.53 4,358.93 4,711.74 5,093.11 5,505.35 
Gross Margin 21.52% 21.52% 21.52% 21.52% 21.52% 
Selling/General/Admin. Expenses, Total 3,062.39 3,310.27 3,578.20 3,867.82 4,180.89 
SG&A Exp / Sales 16.34% 16.34% 16.34% 16.34% 16.34% 
Normalized EBIT 970 1,049 1,134 1,225 1,324 
Tax Rate 23.50% 23.50% 23.50% 23.50% 23.50% 
(+) EBI 742 802 867 937 1,013 
∆ EBI 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 
(+) D&A 373.35 398.25 424.81 453.15 483.38 
∆ D&A 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 
Total Current Assets 2,132.84 2,319.50 2,522.50 2,743.26 2,983.35 
Total Current Liabilities 4,542.79 4,928.58 5,347.13 5,801.22 6,293.88 
Working Capital -2,409.95 -2,609.08 -2,824.63 -3,057.96 -3,310.53 
(-) ∆ Working Capital -183.95 -199.13 -215.55 -233.33 -252.57 
(+) Capital Expenditures -753.80 -789.40 -826.68 -865.72 -906.61 
∆ in Capital Expenditures 4.72% 4.72% 5% 5% 5% 
(=) FCFF 546  610  681  758  843  
Table 16 - Jerónimo Martins' Discounted Cash Flow Valuation Method 
 




















4.1.2 Weighted-Average Cost of Capital 
In order to compute the present value of the FCF, one must first calculate the rate of return that 
the investors will demand for investing in a given firm. Coming up with such figure required 








Tables Table 17, Table 18 and Table 19 show the assumptions that were in place while 
calculating Jerónimo Martins’ weighted-average cost of capital. 
WACC Cost of Debt   
Total Debt 639,200,000 
Capital 2,417,100,000 
D/C 3.86% 
Annual interest payment 26,400,000.00 
Net proceeds from issue of debenture or bond 288,400,000.00 
Kd 4.13% 
Table 17 - Jerónimo Martin's Cost of Debt 
WACC Cost of Equity   
   
Risk-free Rate 2.68% 
β 1.02 
Market Risk Premium 7.71% 
Ke 10.54% 
Table 18 - Jerónimo Martin's Cost of Capital 
 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital   











4.1.3 Discounted Cash-Flow Model 
The first method of valuation used in this thesis will be the Discounted Cash-Flow Model 
through which the company is valued by discounting the Free Cash Flow of the explicit period 
at the WACC rate (i.e., the rate of return required by the firms’ investors).  
Taken that into consideration – and revisiting the projections we based our model on –, the 
following table can guide us through JMT’s valuation. 
DCF Model Assumptions   
  % 
Net Sales Growth Rate 8.09% 
COGS Growth Rate 78.48% 
SG&A Exp. Growth Rate 16.34% 
Perpetual Growth Rate 2.26% 
Tax Rate 23.50% 
D&A Growth Rate 6.67% 
Current Assets Growth Rate 8.75% 
Current Liabilities Growth Rate 8.49% 
CapEx Growth Rate 4.72% 
Table 20 - Jerónimo Martin's DCF Assumptions 
The perpetual growth rate for Jerónimo Martins was assumed to be a weighted-average of each 
countries’ 2023 forecasted growth rate by the IMF and the company’s net sales by country in 
2018. 
By discounting the figures presented on Figure 5 at the weighted-average cost of capital 
presented in the previous section, we get to the following present value of the free cash flow to 
the firm: 
PV FCFF (in million EUR)           
  2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
Present Value of the FCFF 494.89 501.95 507.95 512.98 517.08 
Table 21 - Jerónimo Martin's Present Value of Free Cash Flows to the Firm 
From there, the Terminal Value (TV) has been considered by dividing the 2023’s FCFF by the 
difference between the WACC and the perpetual growth rate which adds up to, around, 
10,540.08M €. Discounted, the present value of the TV corresponds to, approximately, 
6,468.44€. Adding the PV of the FCFF of 2,534.85M euros, the total enterprise value of the 




4.1.3.1 Equity Value 
In order to achieve one’s goal to determine the value of the firm one must add both the PV of 
the FCFF and the TV. Doing so results in a Total Value of the Firm of 9,003.29 million Euros. 
Afterward, one subtracts the firm’s net debt – 93.20M € – reaching an equity value of 
8,910.09M €. 
Enterprise Value   
    
# Shares Outstanding 629,293,220 
Enterprise Value 9,003.29€ 
Net Debt 93.20M€ 
Equity Value  8,910.09M € 
Table 22 - Jerónimo Martin's Equity Value 
 
4.1.4 Relative Valuation 
In order to complement the valuation aforementioned, the value of JMT was also computed 
based on what is known as multiples or relative valuation. To do so, it was taken into 
consideration the peer group retrieved from Thomson Eikon Reuters, 2019, and the multiples 
EV/EBITDA and EV/Sales. 
Based on these values and applying to the acquirer’s data, the results obtained are presented on 
Table 23. 
The multiple Price-to-Sales evaluates the company at its lowest, compared to the remaining 
multiples. Furthermore, both the EV/EBITDA and EV/Sales multiples return very close figures 
both to each other and to the value computed on the previous section – Discounted Cash-Flow 
Model – increasing the firm’s valuation in almost 62% compared to the PS ratio.  
Taken into consideration that the firms chosen to form the peer group have different levels of 





  Valuation (FY+1) 
  EV/EBITDA EV/Sales P-S 
Company Name x x x 
Jeronimo Martins SGPS SA 12.56 0.68 0.53 
Carrefour SA 7.11 0.32 0.17 
Sonae SGPS SA 18.14 0.94 0.30 
Tesco PLC 7.18 0.41 0.35 
Average 11.25 0.59 0.34 
Median 9.87 0.54 0.32 
Figure 6 - Jerónimo Martins' Peer Group - Relative Valuation 
Jerónimo Martins Price Target (in million Euros) 
Normalized EBITDA 2018 964.00 
EV/ EBITDA 10,843.01 M€ 
Net Sales 2018 17,758.61 
EV/Sales 10,425.39 M€ 
Net Sales 2018 19,883.37 
Price-to-Sales 6,683.90 M€ 
Table 23 - Jerónimo Martin's Relative Valuation 
 
4.1.5 Valuation Summary 
After computing the firm’s value, one can conclude that both the EV/Sales and EV/EBITDA 
ratios return very close figures.  
 
Figure 7- Valuation range of Jerónimo Martins' Enterprise Value 
When compared to the current market capitalization of Jerónimo Martins (04.08.2019), the 













Figure 8 - Valuation range of Jerónimo Martins' Equity Value 
  
4.2 Soriana 
4.2.1 Financial Projections 
In the same way one estimated the several components that make up the Free Cash Flow to the 
Firm for Jerónimo Martin, one will also project the financial performance of the Mexican 
retailer, Soriana. 
Being said that, for 2019, the growth rate considered for the Net Sales was simply the growth 
rate of the net sales from 2012 to 2018, which comes up at 7.35% resulting in the figures 
presented at Table 24: 
Net Sales Explicit Period’s Growth (in million MXN) 
  2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
Net Sales 153,475.00 164,759.09 176,872.83 189,877.22 203,837.75 218,824.71 
Table 24 - Soriana's Net Sales Projections 
The ratio of Cost of Goods Sold has been decreasing consistently for the last five years. 
Therefore, its proportion to sales was forecasted based on the average of the past three. To what 
the Selling, General and Administrative Expenses is concerned, it’s proportion to Sales were 
expected to remain similar to what has been observed in the past five years. Consequently, for 
the purpose of this thesis, one assumed that COGS and SG&A Expenses would grow in 
proportion to sales by 77.69% and 16.42%, respectively. Tables Table 25 and Table 26 















COGS Explicit Period’s Growth (in million MXN)  
  2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
COGS 119,125.00 128,006.11 137,147.63 147,521.12 158,367.46 170,011.26 
Table 25 – Soriana’s Cost of Goods Sold Projections 
 
SG&A Expenses Explicit Period’s Growth (in million MXN) 
  2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
SG&A 26,282.00 27,050.65 29,039.52 31,174.62 33,466.71 35,927.31 
Table 26 – Soriana’s SG&A Projections 
Based on the tables previously presented on this section, one was able to compute the projected 
EBIT as shown at Table 27: 
(in million MXN) 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
(+) Net Sales 153,475.00 164,759.09 176,872.83 189,877.22 203,837.75 218,824.71 
(-) COGS 119,125.00 128,006.11 137,147.63 147,521.12 158,367.46 170,011.26 
(-) Selling/General/Admin. Expenses 26,282.00 27,050.65 29,039.52 31,174.62 33,466.71 35,927.31 
(=) EBIT 8,068 9,702 10,416 11,181 12,004 12,886 
Table 27 - Soriana's EBIT Projections 
To what the Depreciation and Amortization and Capital Expenditure is concerned, one used the 
same principles applied to Jerónimo Martins. In other words, to come up with a growth rate for 
D&A, one calculated the average of the yearly ratio between the net value of Property, Plant 
and Equipment and depreciations whereas for Capital Expenditure the growth rate was assumed 
to be based on historical average growth rate of Operating Income. Practically speaking, D&A 
were forecasted to grow by 4.48% each year whereas Capital Expenditures for 2019 to 2023 
were projected based on a 9.03% annual growth rate. 
D&A Explicit Period’s Growth (in million MXN)  
  2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
D&A 2,815.00 2,940.99 3,072.62 3,210.14 3,353.81 3,503.92 





Capital Expenditures Explicit Period’s Growth (in million MXN)  
  2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
CapEx -2,651.00 -2,890.33 -3,151.26 -3,435.76 -3,745.93 -4,084.11 
Table 29 - Soriana's Capital Expenditures Projections 
 
Contrarily to what one considered on Section 4.1.1 for Jerónimo Martins, the current asset 
growth rate for the Mexican retailer throughout the last five years was quite volatile. For that 
reason, a growth rate of 4% was assumed as an alternative. Nonetheless, the same proposition 
does not hold true for current liabilities – which appear to be somewhat constant through the 
historical period. Therefore, for that component of Working Capital, one assumed its historical 
average growth rate as the growth rate for the future, 7.35%. 
∆ Working Capital Explicit Period’s Growth (in million MXN) 
  2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
Current Assets 41,372.00 44,535.51 47,940.91 51,606.71 55,552.81 59,800.65 
Current Liabilities 42,062.00 45,154.56 48,474.51 52,038.55 55,864.63 59,972.01 
Working Capital -690.00 -619.06 -533.60 -431.84 -311.81 -171.36 
∆ Working Capital 0.00 70.94 85.46 101.76 120.02 140.45 





Combining all the aforementioned figures of each of the elements needed to compute the Free 
Cash Flow to the Firm, one can compute the Free Cash Flow to the Firm as shown on Table 31 
and Figure 9: 
 Explicit Period Perpetuity 
Soriana (in million MXN) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
Net Sales 164,759 176,873 189,877 203,838 218,825 
COGS 128,006 137,418 147,521 158,367 170,011 
Gross Profit 36,753 39,455 42,356 47,499 48,813 
Gross Margin 22.31% 22.31% 22.31% 22.31% 22.31% 
Selling/General/Admin. Expenses, Total 27,051 29,040 31,175 33,467 35,927 
SG&A Exp / Sales 16.42% 16.42% 16.42% 16.42% 16.42% 
Normalized EBIT 9,702 10,416 11,181 12,004 12,886 
Tax Rate 33.70% 33.70% 33.70% 33.70% 33.70% 
(+) EBI 6,433 6,906 7,413 9,958 8,544 
∆ EBI 20.26% 7.35% 7.35% 7.35% 7.35% 
(+) D&A 2,941 3,073 3,210 3,354 3,504 
∆ D&A 4.48% 4.48% 4.48% 4.48% 4.48% 
Current Assets 44,536 47,941 51,607 55,553 59,801 
Current Liabilities 45,155 48,475 52,039 55,865 59,972 
Working Capital -619 -534 -432 -312 -171 
(-) ∆ Working Capital 71 85 102 120 140 
(+) Capital Expenditures -2,890 -3,151 -3,436 -3,746 -4,084 
∆ in Capital Expenditures 9.03% 9.03% 9.03% 9.03% 9.03% 
(=) FCF 6,412  6,741 7,086 7,446 7,823 
Table 31 - Soriana's Discounted Cash Flow Valuation Method 
  
Figure 9 - Soriana's Free Cash Flow to the Firm 
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4.2.2 Weighted-Average Cost of Capital 
In order to calculate the weighted-average cost of capital of Soriana, the method previously 
mentioned at section 4.1.2 was used. 
Therefore, one started by computing the Mexican retailer’s cost of debt. To do so, the figures 
and cost of both short-term and long-term debt were retrieved from Thomson Reuters Eikon, 
2019. Through the performance of the calculation, Soriana’s cost of debt was estimated at 
around 10.27%. 
WACC Cost of Debt   
Total Debt 22,663,000,000 
Capital 132,632,000,000 
D/C 15.41% 
Annual interest payment 2,328,000,000.00 
Net proceeds from issue of debenture or bond 14,229,000,000.00 
Kd 10.27% 
Table 32 - Soriana's Cost of Debt 
Moving forward to deriving the cost of equity, it was necessary to form a peer group. Based on 
Thomson Reuters Eikon’s peer group suggestion, one reduced the group to the following firms: 
Grupo Comercial Chedraui SAB de CV, El Puerto De Liverpool SAB De CV, Shanghai Bailian 
Group Co Ltd and Massmart Holdings Ltd. The original peer group also included Walmart Inc, 
El Puerto de Liverpool SAB de CV and Wal Mart de Mexico SAB de CV. However, due to the 
significant difference between Soriana’s EBITDA and Net Sales and each of the 
aforementioned players, they were disconsidered for the purpose of this thesis on the basis that 
they were too big and did not quite reflect Soriana’s operation. 
The levered betas of the companies which compose the peer group are 0.97, 0.97, 1.20, 1.18 
and 1.04, respectively, whereas Soriana’s levered beta comes up at around 0.92. 
Considering a risk-free rate of 7.05% and a market risk premium of 7.63%, the cost of equity 






WACC Cost of Equity   
   
Risk-free Rate 7.05% 
β 0.92 
Market Risk Premium 7.63% 
Ke 14.07% 
Table 33 - Soriana's Cost of Equity 
By applying the ratios of (Gross) Debt-to-Capital (15.41%) and Equity-to-Capital (84.59%), 
based on 2018’s values and using the same marginal tax rate as for Soriana (33.70%) the WACC 
was determined to be 12.95%. 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital   







Table 34 - Soriana's Weighted Average Cost of Capital Inputs 
 
4.2.3 Discounted Cash-Flow Model 
According to what has been exposed on the previous section, Table 35 summarizes all the 
assumptions made. 
DCF Model Assumptions 
  % 
Net Sales Growth Rate 7.35% 
COGS Growth Rate 77.69% 
SG&A Exp. Growth Rate 16.42% 
Perpetual Growth Rate 2.30% 
Tax Rate 33.70% 
D&A Growth Rate 4.48% 
Current Assets Growth Rate 7.65% 
Current Liabilities Growth Rate 7.35% 
CapEx Growth Rate 9.03% 
Table 35- Soriana's DCF Assumptions 
The perpetual growth rate assumed was based on IMF’s forecasted growth rate for the Mexican 




 By discounting these figures at the WACC rate presented previously, we get to the following 
present value of the free cash flow to the firm: 
PV FCFF (in million MXN)           
  2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
Present Value of the FCFF 5,677.11 5,284.13 4,917.28 4,574.81 4,255.11 
Table 36 - Soriana's Present Value of Free Cash Flows to the Firm 
In order to finish the valuation of the firm, one must only calculate the Terminal Value (TV). 
Applying the same rationale used to compute JMT’s TV, Soriana’s TV adds up to 73,445.67M 
MXN which discounted to the present moment equals 39,949.51M MXN. Adding that to 
Soriana’s present value of the FCFF, 24,708.44 million Mexican New Pesos, one gets to a final 
enterprise value of around 64,657.95M MXN. 
 
4.2.3.1 Equity Value 
Ultimately, the equity value will equal the sum of present value of each year’s FCFF and the 
TV discounted of the firm’s net debt – i.e., 24,708.44, 39,949.51 and 20,434 million Mexico 
New Pesos, respectively. 
Accordingly, one values Soriana’s Equity Value at 44,223.95M MXN. 
Equity Value   
# Shares Outstanding 1,799,880,000 
Enterprise Value 64,657.95M MXN 
Net Debt 20,434M MXN 
Equity Value  44,223.95M MXN 
MXN/Share 24.57 






4.2.4 Relative Valuation 
The peer group suggested by Thomson Reuters Eikon, 2019, was the starting point for the 
relative valuation of the Mexican retailer. However, there were a few players which did not 
quite reflect Soriana’s size. Consequently, for the purpose of this thesis, one adjusted it by 
substituiting Walmart Inc, Wal Mart de Mexico SAB de CV and Kimberly-Clark de Mexico 
SAB de CV among others by Shanghai Bailian Group Co Ltd Massmart Holdings Ltd. 
The same multiples used on Section 4.1.4, EV/EBITDA, EV/Sales and Price-to-Sales, served 
as the basis for calculating the relative value of the Mexican Retailer. Likewise, the final 
multiple is the average of the multiple of all the companies within the per group.  
To compute the enterprise value, values of 2018 both for EBITDA and Sales were considered. 
EV/Sales has the highest firm’s valuation whereas Price-to-Sales returns the lowest. The 
difference between both ratios comes up to around 28,750M Mexican New Pesos. This might 
be a consequence of the high ratio of operational costs that it’s observed in Retail, comparing 
to the remaining costs. 
Company Name 
Valuation (FY+1) 
EV/EBITDA EV/Sales P-S 
x x x 
Organizacion Soriana SAB de CV 6.04 0.46 0.29 
Grupo Comercial Chedraui SAB de CV 8.84 0.60 0.20 
El Puerto De Liverpool SAB De CV 7.53 1.38 0.88 
Shanghai Bailian Group Co Ltd 5.76 0.18 0.31 
Massmart Holdings Ltd 3.76 0.11 0.11 
Average 6.39 0.55 0.36 
Median 6.04 0.46 0.29 





Soriana Price Target (in million Mexican New Pesos)   
Normalized EBITDA 2018 10,883.00 
EV/ EBITDA 69,509.61M MXN 
Net Sales 2018 153,475.00 
EV/Sales 83,867.14M MXN 
Net Sales 2018 153,475.00 
Price-to-Sales 55,116.88M MXN 
Table 38 - Soriana's Relative Valuation 
 
4.2.5 Valuation Summary 
Contrarily to what happened with Jerónimo Martins, Soriana actually presents highly volatile 
multiples with each differencing quite substantially from the other.  
Nonetheless, EV/EBITDA returns a figure somewhat similar to the one which was computed 
by using the discounted cash flow model.  
 
Figure 11 - Valuation range of Soriana's Enterprise Value (in million Mexican New Pesos) 
Taking into consideration that there’s such a huge difference between the valuation based on 
the DCF Model and all the alternatives based on relative valuation, one can argue that the 
chosen peer group might not be the most representative of Soriana’s operation. 
However, considering that the current market cap is closer to the EV/EBITDA than any other 
valuation alternative, one can also make the case that the peer group is, indeed, symbolic of 
Soriana’s business model. In that case, the discounted cash flow model would be the one which 














Figure 12 - Valuation range of Soriana's Equity Value (in million Mexican New Pesos) 
 
5 Synergies 
M&A operations are often justified as a mean to achieve a greater combined value for both 
companies that either could achieve on its own. Usually described as synergies, the 
improvements that occur when two or more companies’ operations are combined can either be 
classified as operational or financial whether such opportunities are related to the business itself 
or to financial benefits arising from the combination of the two firms, respectively. 
Taken into consideration that for the purpose of this thesis one is examining two companies 
whose financials are reported in different currencies, an extra effort must first be undertaken to 
standardize the Income Statements, Balance Sheets and Cash Flows. 
To do so, one must resort to the exchange rate between the Mexican New Peso (MXN) and the 
Euro (EUR). Yet, estimating the financial projections for the combined company based on the 
current MXN/EUR exchange rate would only be possible if one assumed that there would be 
no change in the current exchange rate in the future. Considering this is most likely not the case, 
to overcome this obstacle, one assumed that the relative Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) between 
Mexico and the Eurozone will be held constant in the future and applied the formula below to 
forecast the expected EUR/MXN exchange rate: 
𝑆𝑀𝑋𝑁/𝐸𝑈𝑅, 𝑡1

















Using the values on Table 39 the values estimated can be observed on Table 40. 
 
Forecasting Foreign Currency Exchange rates – Assumptions 
 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
𝜋𝑀𝑋𝑁 3.81% 3.11% 3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 
𝜋𝐸𝑈𝑅 1.55% 1.72% 1.82% 1.96% 2.00% 
Table 39 - MXN/Eur Exchange Rate's Forecast's Assumptions 
 
 Forecasting Foreign Currency Exchange rates 
 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
𝑆𝑀𝑋𝑁/𝐸𝑈𝑅,𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝑃  21.53 22.01 22.31 22.57 22.80 23.02 
Table 40 - MXN/Eur Exchange Rate's Forecast 
5.1 Combined firm without synergies 
The process of analyzing the potential synergies that might come out of a M&A deal starts with 
the analysis of the financial performance of the firm which results from the combination of the 
two companies. Simply put, this step requires nothing more than the assessment of the value of 
both companies as one combined firm – i.e. as a stand-alone business. 
As previously mentioned, considering that both companies report its figures in its own 
countries’ currency, one must first standardize the currency. For the purpose of this thesis, one 
will convert Soriana’s financial statements to euros prior to the integration of both firm’s 
financial statements based on the respecting year’s exchange rates presented on Table 40.  
From there onwards, one consolidated both firm’s financials and found the weighted average 
cost of capital which allowed to discount the consolidated financials to the same figure as the 
sum of the enterprise values for Jerónimo Martins and Soriana previously calculated in sections 
4.1.3 and 4.2.3, respectively – 11.28%. 
Assuming Jerónimo Martin’s was valued at 9,003.29 million Euros whereas Soriana would be 
worth 64,657.95 million Mexican New Pesos or, around, 3,003.16 million Euros, the newly 




5.2 Combined firm with synergies 
5.2.1.1 Operational Synergies - Revenues Enhancements 
The purchase of Soriana by Jerónimo Martins will provide access to new distribution channels 
which can be exploited both ways. Hence, the new enterprise will be able to take advantage of 
cross-selling in two different – yet complementary – ways. Latin America’s consumers have 
internalized the idea that products made in Europe have higher standards of production. 
Therefore, they value these very highly. Thus, to take advantage of this bias, Jerónimo Martins 
could substitute white-label products produced under Soriana’s tag by JMT’s in the Mexican 
stores. On the other hand, JMT could take advantage of another great opportunity by replacing 
local products sold at ARA by the white-label ones from Soriana. If one assumed that such 
product replacement would be available for 10% of the sold products and which would generate 
a 15% increase in revenue. Numerically, this would translate itself into 0.71M € (1.5% based 
on Soriana’s 2018 Net Income, 171.2) and 0.21M € (1.5% from 3.45%, proportion of 
Colombian operation, of Jeronimo Martin’s Net Income) totaling 0.92M€ yearly. 
Similarly, online business could be proven to be an excellent opportunity to increase value for 
the firm’s shareholders. Taken into consideration how much the proportion of grocery spend 
made online has been increasing over the years, according to a report from OneSpace, a product 
merchandising platform, being present in the World Wide Web is a must in 2019 for any player 
who wishes to either increase or, at least, retain its market share. Although Soriana already 
offers its customers the opportunity of purchasing their groceries online, there are several of 
firms of JMT’s group which do not. Taking this into consideration, the Portuguese retailer could 
use Soriana’s know-how of the online business to expand it to all the countries in which it 
operates in. As a result, it was assumed that the company would witness a 10% increase in net 
income based on ARA’s proportion in JMT’s group operation which would constitute an 
increment of 1.39M Euros each year in revenues. 
5.2.1.2 Operational Synergies – Costs Savings 
One of the most common cost savings in M&A is the increase of power over suppliers which 




of goods – both local and imported. Moreover, the company would also be able to take 
advantage of cost savings to which the transportation and subsequent needed distribution is 
concerned. According to Tompkins (2012) the decrease in cost of sales due to increased power 
over suppliers represents, on average, 5 to 10% of the total cost savings in the combined firm. 
Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis, one assumed a conservative position of 5% in cost of 
sales reduction once the two firms are combined. 
5.2.1.3 Operational Cost Increases 
Nonetheless, by combining both firms together it is also expected that the complexity increases. 
Therefore, one also assumed a cost increase of 2% in Selling, General and Administrative 
Expenses. 
 
5.2.1.4 Acquisition Financial Costs 
Although there are some potential costs savings and revenues improvements, the combined firm 
must, simultaneously, incur in several expenses to guarantee that the acquisition is successful. 
Examples such as acquisition and integrated costs, legal, accounting and investment banking 
consultancy fees, creating a unique company culture and indemnities paid to employees for 
being out of the company for the remaining years of their career resulting from duplication of 
jobs and the subsequent need to reduce it as much as possible.  
Advisory, legal and accounting fees in an M&A operation typically represent 1.5% of the total 
value of the of the target, 3,003.16M €. Hence, it would translate into 45.05 million Euros. 
Unfortunately, most mergers fail because companies are unable to integrate properly. To make 
sure that does not happen in this case, costs of harmonizing work methods and creating a unique 
culture were estimated at 14% of the total value of the acquisition based on a research done by 
the advisory-firm Ernst & Young on 2014 which has shown that shows that, on average, 
companies spend 14% of the deal value on the integration, 420.44€ M. 
All the aforementioned expenses were estimated at around 465.49 million Euros, 185.19 million 




Value of Synergies 
Taking into consideration the Weighted Average Cost of Capital mentioned in Section 5.1 and 
the operational and financial synergies forecasted in Section 5.2, one used the Discounted Cash 
Flow Method once more to compute the value of the combined firm. 
Using the inputs previously mention, the present value of the terminal value came up to 
9,359.77 million Euros whereas the present value of the Free Cash Flow to the Firm came up 
to 4,055.57M. Ultimately, the total value was estimated at 13,415.35 million Euros. 
Consequently, the synergies can be forecasted to be around 1,408.90M €. 
 
Figure 13 - Combined Firm's Free Cash Flow to the Firm w/out synergies 
  

































Synergies (in million Euros)   
    
Soriana's Enterprise Value 3,003.16 
JMT's Enterprise Value 9,003.29 
Total Combined Firm's Value w/out Synergies 12,006.45 
Total Combined Firm's Value w/ Synergies 13,415.35 
Total Value of Synergies 1,408.90 
Table 41 - Synergies resulting from the acquisition 
 
6 The Transaction 
Value of the Acquisition 
For the purpose of this thesis, it is assumed that Jerónimo Martins would buy all Soriana’s 
outstanding shares, becoming the sole owner of the Mexican company.  
For the sake of advising Jerónimo Martins how much to pay for such ownership, the valuation 
of both companies was within the scope of this thesis. Yet, Jerónimo Martins would have to 
pay at least the current market value of Soriana (2,319.86 million Euros or 1.29€ per share). 
Nonetheless, taking potential synergies into consideration might allow Jerónimo Martins to go 
further than the current market price due to the fact that the merger of both companies will 
increase its value compared to both stand-alone valuations. If done so, the premium offered 
might entice Soriana’s current shareholders to join forces with the Portuguese company. 
One has yet to define how much Jerónimo Martins should be willing to pay for the acquisition 
until it decides it is no longer in the firm’s interest to acquire Soriana. In other words, what is 
the walk-away price which should be set up right from the very beginning of the negotiation 
process to assure JMT does not get caught up in the deal and ends up overpaying.  
One would suggest that the maximum premium of the acquisition should be the present value 
of all the cost savings likely to be achieved plus the revenues’ enhancement. Yet, in order to 
save some value for JMT’s shareholders, for the purpose of this thesis, one will suggest that 
75% of the synergies are given to Soriana’s shareholders, in order to entice them to allow the 




would be translated into 1,056.67 and 352.22 million euros for Soriana and Jerónimo Martins, 
respectively . Based on this, the Portuguese retailer would be expected to spend 3,110.74 
million Euros to pursue the aforementioned acquisition – 2,054.06 million Euros for the 
Mexican company’s market equity value based on the DCF method and 1,056.67 million Euros 
for its synergies – which corresponds to a premium over the market cap of, approximately, 34%. 
 
Transaction Approach 
According to the literature, hostile transactions typically result in higher returns for the target’s 
shareholders. Nonetheless, both firms will combine with the common goal of increasing the 
value that each would have in a stand-alone basis. For that reason, pursuing such a path would 
only contribute to the cultures clash phenomenon, which is not desirable. 
Furthermore, Soriana’s ownership in highly concentrated in the founder’s family. 
Consequently, it is highly unlikely that they would allow for a hostile take-over from another 
player due to all the emotions involved in a family-owned business. Therefore, there is no 
incentive to pursue such alternative. Instead, Jerónimo Martins should focus on showing how 
both firms could work together to exploit the synergies available and how value-creation for 
shareholders of both firms would be pursued. 
 
Method of Payment 
As presented on section 1.4, several authors – Harris and Raviv (1988), Stulz (1988) and 
Amihud, Lev, Travlos (1990), Martin (1996) – have shown that there are multiple factors 
influencing the chosen payment method such as the target and acquiring dimensions, existence 
each companies’ investment opportunities, manager’s personality traits, among others. In other 
words, not only financials take part in how an acquisition is financed. 
Yet, Travlos, N. (1987), Hazelkorn, T., Zenner, M. and Shivdasani, A. (2004) have proved that 




which do so through pure stock exchange experience significant losses. Consequently, 
acquisitions are usually paid in cash. 
At the end of the fiscal year of 2018, Jerónimo Martins had 546 million Euros in Cash and 
Short-Term Investments. Despite such a large amount in liquid assets, the firm does not have 
the ability to finance the purchase the Mexican retailer’s ownership through cash, without 
issuing new debt. Nonetheless, considering that the interest rates are currently at historic low 
levels, the Portuguese player will not have a high interest expenses burden able to finance the 
transaction. Therefore, it should finance the operation by issuing new debt to pay for the 
acquisition in cash, which would go along with the literature which states that all-cash deals 
tend to provide positive returns to all shareholders involved.  
 
7 Post-Merger Integration 
History has shown us that one of the reasons most mergers and acquisition deal fail can be 
derived from bad planning and emotions getting in the way of decisions. It is, then, safe to say 
that planning represents one of the most important steps when going through a M&A deal. For 
that reason, it is of the utmost importance that Jerónimo Martins defines how the plan would be 
laid out if the transaction is successful, while conducting a thorough due diligence.  
Soriana has a better know-how of the market in which it operates in. Moreover, Latin American 
culture is quite different from the European. Therefore, one should suggest that not only its 
management but also its employees should be preserved. This decision would also minimize 
the aggressiveness of the offer, making more likely that the target company would accept the 
deal. 
Nonetheless, in order to make sure everyone feels part of the new company and that there no 
longer two separate companies but one single entity, the combined firm should invest highly in 
avoiding culture clashes. For that purpose, it is of this thesis suggestion that Jerónimo Martins 
builds up a concrete plan on the basis of workshops of shared experiences of employees of both 




countries in which the firms operate in (Portugal, Poland, Colombia and Mexico) to increase 
employees’ culture awareness. 
 
8 Conclusion 
The retail sector will undergo a lot of changes in the near future. With gross margins 
consistently being diminished, the only alternative for players wishing to thrive is to invest in 
new deal opportunities which allow them to get ahead of the competition.  
It is of this thesis’ author’s opinion that a merger with Soriana might allow Jerónimo Martins 
an opportunity to increase its market presence and, consequently, to better equip itself not only 
to face its fierce competition but also for the changes that lie ahead. 
On the other hand, it might be the event that Soriana has been waiting for to change its course. 
Tapping into Jerónimo Martin’s multi-continental supply chain might allow for the exploitation 
of the Portuguese giant’s strengths by the Mexican retailer contributing to the restructuring of 
its debt and to the adjustment of its weakening cost structures. 
Jerónimo Martins would offer 3,110.74 million Euros for the full control of the company, which 
values each share at 1.73€. Soriana’s shareholders would then have a gain of 0.44€ for each 
share sold, an increase by 34.11% from 1.29€/share. This price also ensures the creation of 






9.1 Jerónimo Martins’ Historical Financial Ratios 
Profitability 
         
  Industry Median 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Gross Margin 27.6% 20.6% 21.2% 22.1% 21.2% 22.2% 22.4% 22.4% 
Operating Margin 9.4% 5.2% 5.3% 4.9% 4.9% 5.6% 6.0% 5.3% 
 
DuPont/Earning Power 
                  
  Industry Median 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Asset Turnover 1.0% 1.41 1.37 1.28 1.20 1.30 1.19 1.17 
Pretax ROA 5.60% 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 
Pretax ROE 11.1% 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.09 
 
Liquidity 
                  
  Industry Median 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Quick Ratio 0.9 0.31 0.37 0.38 1.26 0.29 0.3 0.28 
Current Ratio 1.74 0.89 1.01 1.1 2.04 0.98 0.99 0.98 
Times Interest Earned 5.8 18.2 - - - 4.4 3.7 3.5 
 
Operating 
                  
  Industry Median 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
A/R Turnover 12.6 18.40 16.20 15.90 19.00 33.50 33.80 21.70 





9.2 Soriana’s Historical Financial Ratios 
Profitability 
                  
  Industry Median 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Gross Margin 23.4% 20.6% 21.2% 22.1% 21.2% 22.2% 22.4% 22.4% 
EBITDA Margin 7.7% 7.1% 7.2% 6.9% 6.8% 7.9% 7.1% 7.7% 
 
DuPont/Earning Power 
                  
  Industry Median 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Pretax ROA 5.60% 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 
 
Liquidity 
                  
  Industry Median 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Quick Ratio 0.51 0.31 0.37 0.38 1.26 0.29 0.30 0.28 
Current Ratio 1.03 0.89 1.01 1.1 2.04 0.98 0.97 0.98 
Times Interest Earned 16.6 18.2 - - - 4.4 3.6 3.5 
 
Operating 
                  
  Industry Median 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Inv Turnover 7.8 6.20 5.80 5.10 5.10 5.30 4.60 4.30 
 
9.3 Jerónimo Martins’ Forecasted Net Sales’ Growth 
Net Sales Explicit Period’s Growth (in million EUR)  
  2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 





9.4 Jerónimo Martins’ Forecasted COGS’ Growth 
COGS Explicit Period’s Growth (in million EUR)  
  2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
COGS 13,606.42 14,707.73 15,898.19 17,184.99 18,575.96 20,079.50 
 
9.5 Jerónimo Martins Forecasted SG&A Expenses Growth 
SG&A Expenses Explicit Period’s Growth (in million EUR) 
  2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
SG&A 2,833.08 3,062.39 3,310.27 3,578.20 3,867.82 4,180.89 
 
9.6 Jerónimo Martins’ EBIT Projections 
(in million EUR) 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
(+) Net Sales 17,337.00 18,740.27 20,257.11 21,896.74 23,669.07 25,584.86 
(-) COGS 13,606.42 14,707.73 15,898.19 17,184.99 18,575.96 20,079.50 
(-) Selling/General/Admin. Expenses 2,833.08 3,062.39 3,310.27 3,578.20 3,867.82 4,180.89 
(=) EBIT 897 970 1,049 1,134 1,225 1,324 
 
9.7 Jerónimo Martins’ Forecasted D&A’s Growth 
D&A Explicit Period’s Growth (in million EUR)  
  2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 





9.8 Jerónimo Martins’ Forecasted D&A’s Growth 
∆ Working Capital Explicit Period’s Growth (in million EUR) 
  2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
Current Assets 1,961.20 2,132.84 2,139.50 2,522.50 2,743.26 2,983.35 
Current Liabilities 4,187.20 4,452.79 4,928.58 5,347.13 5,801.22 6,293.88 
Working Capital -2,226.00 -2,409.95 -2,609.08 -2,824.63 -3,057.96 -3,310.53 
∆ Working Capital 0.00 -183.95 -199.13 -215.55 -233.33 -252.57 
 
9.9 Jerónimo Martins’ Forecasted Capital Expenditures’ Growth 
Capital Expenditures Explicit Period’s Growth (in million EUR)  
  2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
CapEx -719.80 -753.80 -789.40 -826.68 -865.72 -906.61 
 
9.10 Jeronimo Martin’s Weighted-Average Cost of Capital 
WACC Cost of Debt   
Total Debt 639,200,000 
Capital 2,417,100,000 
D/C 3.86% 
Annual interest payment 26,400,000.00 
Net proceeds from issue of debenture or bond 288,400,000.00 
Kd 4.13% 
 
WACC Cost of Equity   
   
Risk-free Rate 2.68% 
β 1.02 







Weighted Average Cost of Capital   








9.11 Jeronimo Martins’ Discounted Cash-Flow Model Assumptions 
DCF Model Assumptions   
  % 
Net Sales Growth Rate 8.09% 
COGS Growth Rate 78.48% 
SG&A Exp. Growth Rate 16.34% 
Perpetual Growth Rate 2.26% 
Tax Rate 23.50% 
D&A Growth Rate 6.67% 
Current Assets Growth Rate 8.75% 
Current Liabilities Growth Rate 8.49% 
CapEx Growth Rate 4.72% 
 
9.12 Jerónimo Martins’ Historical Net Sales’ Growth Rate 
Net Sale’s Growth Rate               
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Net Sales 10,876.00 11,829.00 12,680.00 13,728.00 14,622.00 16,276.00 17,337.00 
∆ Net Sales  8.76% 7.19% 8.26% 6.51% 11.31% 6.52% 
 
9.13 Jerónimo Martins’ Historical Cost of Goods Sold in proportion to Sales 
COGS to Sales               
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Net Sales 10,876.00 11,829.00 12,680.00 13,728.00 14,622.00 16,276.00 17,337.00 
Cost of Revenues 8,450.00 9,289.00 9,989.00 10,790.00 11,509.00 12,818.00 13,577.00 





9.14 Jerónimo Martins Historical SG&A Expenses in proportion to Sales 
SG&A to Sales               
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Net Sales 10,876.00 11,829.00 12,680.00 13,728.00 14,622.00 16,276.00 17,337.00 
SG&A 1,664.00 1,756.00 1,949.00 2,127.00 2,561.00 2,867.00 3,164.00 
SG&A/Sales 15.30% 14.84% 15.37% 15.49% 17.51% 17.61% 18.25% 
 
9.15 Jerónimo Martins’ Historical Depreciation/Amortization’s Growth Rate 
Depreciation/Amortization               
  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Total PPE Net 2,600.20 2,782.80 2,773.30 2,890.10 3,023.40 3,474.80 3,690.50 
Depreciation/Amortization 0.00 128.90 213.60 222.90 182.40 269.80 228.00 
 Depreciation/PPE  4.63% 7.70% 7.71% 6.03% 7.76% 6.18% 
 
9.16 Jerónimo Martins’ Free Cash Flow to the Firm’s Forecast 
 Explicit Period Perpetuity 
JMT (in million Euros) 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
Net Sales 17,337.00 18,740.27 20,257.11 21,896.74 23,669.07 25,584.86 
COGS 13,606.42 14,707.73 15,898.19 17,184.99 18,575.96 20,079.50 
Gross Profit 3,730.58 4,032.53 4,358.93 4,711.74 5,093.11 5,505.35 
Gross Margin 21.52% 21.52% 21.52% 21.52% 21.52% 21.52% 
Selling/General/Admin. Expenses, Total 2,833.08 3,062.39 3,310.27 3,578.20 3,867.82 4,180.89 
SG&A Exp / Sales 16.34% 16.34% 16.34% 16.34% 16.34% 16.34% 
Normalized EBIT 897 970 1,049 1,134 1,225 1,324 
Tax Rate 23.50% 23.50% 23.50% 23.50% 23.50% 23.50% 
(+) EBI 687 742 802 867 937 1,013 
∆ EBI -89% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 
(+) D&A 350.00 373.35 398.25 424.81 453.15 483.38 
∆ D&A -89% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 
Total Current Assets 1,961.20 2,132.84 2,319.50 2,522.50 2,743.26 2,983.35 
Total Current Liabilities 4,187.20 4,542.79 4,928.58 5,347.13 5,801.22 6,293.88 
Working Capital -2,226.00 -2,409.95 -2,609.08 -2,824.63 -3,057.96 -3,310.53 
(-) ∆ Working Capital 0.00 -183.95 -199.13 -215.55 -233.33 -252.57 
(+) Capital Expenditures -719.80 -753.80 -789.40 -826.68 -865.72 -906.61 
∆ in Capital Expenditures 0% 4.72% 4.72% 5% 5% 5% 




9.17 Jerónimo Martins’ Present Value for the Free Cash Flows to the Firm 
PV FCFF (in million EUR)           
  2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
Present Value of the FCFF 494.89 501.95 507.95 512.98 517.08 
 
9.18 Jeronimo Martins’ Total Value of the Firm Summary 
Enterprise Value   
    
# Shares Outstanding 629,293,220 
Enterprise Value 9,003.29€ 
Net Debt 93.20M€ 
Equity Value  8,910.09M € 
€/Share 14.16€ 
 
9.19 Jerónimo Martins’ Multiples 
Jerónimo Martins Price Target (in million Euros) 
Normalized EBITDA 2018 964.00 
EV/ EBITDA 10,843.01 M€ 
Net Sales 2018 17,758.61 
EV/Sales 10,425.39 M€ 
Net Sales 2018 19,883.37 
Price-to-Sales 6,683.90 M€ 
 
9.20 Soriana’s Forecasted Net Sales’ Growth 
Net Sales Explicit Period’s Growth (in million MXN) 
  2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 





9.21 Soriana’s Forecasted COGS’ Growth 
COGS Explicit Period’s Growth (in million MXN)  
  2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
COGS 119,125.00 128,006.11 137,147.63 147,521.12 158,367.46 170,011.26 
 
9.22 Soriana’s EBIT Projections 
(in million MXN) 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
(+) Net Sales 153,475.00 164,759.09 176,872.83 189,877.22 203,837.75 218,824.71 
(-) COGS 119,125.00 128,995.89 138,480.18 148,661.79 159,591.99 171,325.83 
(-) SG&A 26,282.00 27,050.65 29,039.52 31,174.62 33,466.71 35,927.31 
(=) EBIT 8,068.00 8,712.55 9,353.13 10,040.81 10,779.05 11,571.57 
 
9.23 Soriana’s Forecasted D&A’s Growth 
D&A Explicit Period’s Growth (in million MXN)  
  2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
D&A 2,815.00 2,940.99 3,072.62 3,210.14 3,353.81 3,503.92 
 
9.24 Soriana’s Forecasted CapEx’s Growth 
Capital Expenditures Explicit Period’s Growth (in million MXN)  
  2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 






9.25 Soriana’s Forecasted Changes in Working Capital’s Growth 
∆ Working Capital Explicit Period’s Growth (in million MXN) 
  2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
Current Assets 41,372.00 44,535.51 47,940.91 51,606.71 55,552.81 59,800.65 
Current Liabilities 42,062.00 45,154.56 48,474.51 52,038.55 55,864.63 59,972.01 
Working Capital -690.00 -619.06 -533.60 -431.84 -311.81 -171.36 
∆ Working Capital 0.00 70.94 85.46 101.76 120.02 140.45 
 
9.26 Soriana’s Historical Depreciation/Amortization’s Growth Rate 
Depreciation/Amortization               
  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Total PPE Net 42,292.00 43,769.00 44,648.00 44,199.00 70,450.00 69,969.00 69,912.00 
Depreciation/Amortization  1,682.00 1,681.00 1,280.00 6,996.00 2,419.00 2,071.00 
 Depreciation/PPE 0.00% 3.84% 3.77% 2.90% 9.93% 3.46% 2.96% 
 
9.27 Soriana’s Weighted-Average Cost of Capital 
WACC Cost of Debt   
Total Debt 22,663,000,000 
Capital 132,632,000,000 
D/C 15.41% 
Annual interest payment 2,328,000,000.00 
Net proceeds from issue of debenture or bond 14,229,000,000.00 
Kd 10.27% 
 
WACC Cost of Equity   
   
Risk-free Rate 7.05% 
β 0.92 







Weighted Average Cost of Capital   








9.28 Soriana’s Discounted Cash-Flow Model’s Assumptions 
DCF Model Assumptions 
  % 
Net Sales Growth Rate 7.35% 
COGS Growth Rate 77.69% 
SG&A Exp. Growth Rate 16.42% 
Perpetual Growth Rate 2.30% 
Tax Rate 33.70% 
D&A Growth Rate 4.48% 
Current Assets Growth Rate 7.65% 
Current Liabilities Growth Rate 7.35% 
CapEx Growth Rate 9.03% 
 
9.29 Soriana Net Sales’ Historical Growth Rate 
Net Sale’s Growth Rate               
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Net Sales 104,611.00 105,028.00 101,829.00 109,380.00 149,522.00 153,637.00 153,475.00 
∆ Net Sales  0.40% -3.05% 7.42% 36.70% 2.75% -0.11% 
 
9.30 Soriana’s Historical Cost of Goods Sold in proportion to Sales 
COGS to Sales               
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Net Sales c 105,028.00 101,829.00 109,380.00 149,522.00 153,637.00 153,475.00 
COGS 83,059.00 82,799.00 79,338.00 86,225.00 116,361.00 119,281.00 119,125.00 





9.31 Soriana’s Historical SG&A Expenses in proportion to Sales 
SG&A to Sales               
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Net Sales 104,611.00 105,028.00 101,829.00 109,380.00 149,522.00 153,637.00 153,475.00 
SG&A Expenses 16,142.00 16,671.00 17,514.00 17,849.00 24,785.00 25,206.00 26,282.00 
SG&A/Sales 15.30% 15.87% 17.20% 16.32% 16.58% 16.41% 17.12% 
 
9.32 Soriana’s Historical Depreciation/Amortization’s Growth Rate 
Depreciation/Amortization               
  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Total PPE Net 42,292.00 43,769.00 44,648.00 44,199.00 70,450.00 69,969.00 69,912.00 
Depreciation/Amortization 0.00 1,682.00 1,681.00 1,280.00 6,996.00 2,419.00 2,071.00 
 Depreciation/PPE  3.84% 3.77% 2.90% 9.93% 3.46% 2.96% 
 
9.33 Soriana’s Free Cash Flow to the Firm’s Forecast 
 Explicit Period Perpetuity 
Soriana (in million MXN) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
Net Sales 164,759 176,873 189,877 203,838 218,825 
COGS 128,006 137,418 147,521 158,367 170,011 
Gross Profit 36,753 39,455 42,356 47,499 48,813 
Gross Margin 22.31% 22.31% 22.31% 22.31% 22.31% 
Selling/General/Admin. Expenses, Total 27,051 29,040 31,175 33,467 35,927 
SG&A Exp / Sales 16.42% 16.42% 16.42% 16.42% 16.42% 
Normalized EBIT 9,702 10,416 11,181 12,004 12,886 
Tax Rate 33.70% 33.70% 33.70% 33.70% 33.70% 
(+) EBI 6,433 6,906 7,413 9,958 8,544 
∆ EBI 20.26% 7.35% 7.35% 7.35% 7.35% 
(+) D&A 2,941 3,073 3,210 3,354 3,504 
∆ D&A 4.48% 4.48% 4.48% 4.48% 4.48% 
Current Assets 44,536 47,941 51,607 55,553 59,801 
Current Liabilities 45,155 48,475 52,039 55,865 59,972 
Working Capital -619 -534 -432 -312 -171 
(-) ∆ Working Capital 71 85 102 120 140 
(+) Capital Expenditures -2,890 -3,151 -3,436 -3,746 -4,084 
∆ in Capital Expenditures 9.03% 9.03% 9.03% 9.03% 9.03% 





9.34 Soriana’s Present Value for the Free Cash Flows to the Firm 
PV FCFF (in million MXN)           
  2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
Present Value of the FCFF 5,677.11 5,284.13 4,917.28 4,574.81 4,255.11 
 
9.35 Soriana’s Total Value of the Firm’s Summary 
Equity Value   
# Shares Outstanding 1,799,880,000 
Enterprise Value 64,657.95M MXN 
Net Debt 20,434M MXN 
Equity Value  44,223.95M MXN 
MXN/Share 24.57 
 
9.36 Soriana’s Multiples 
Soriana Price Target (in million Mexican New Pesos)   
Normalized EBITDA 2018 10,883.00 
EV/ EBITDA 69,509.61M MXN 
Net Sales 2018 153,475.00 
EV/Sales 83,867.14M MXN 
Net Sales 2018 153,475.00 
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